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INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: How THE U.N.
CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY
FISH STOCKS CHANGES THE LAW OF FISHING
ON THE HIGH SEAS
INTRODUCTION
Overfishing is one of the biggest threats to our oceans. Technological
advances in the fishing industry have made it easier to catch larger numbers
of fish' to satisfy an increasing demand for food by growing populations.'
As a result, most of the commercially harvested fish species are either
depleted or overexploited.' After peaking in 1989, yearly fish catches have
steadily declined.' Several of these exploited fish stocks have collapsed and
may never be replenished.' Others will be replenished only over a long
period of time.6 This situation has drastically effected the balance of our
ocean ecosystems.
Overfishing has also had severe economic implications. The decrease in
fish catches has depressed much of the global fishing industry. An estimated
100,000 jobs have been lost and once prosperous fishing industries and towns
now survive on government subsidies and welfare.7 Entire fishing-based
1. Technological advances include satellite imagery to track and find fish, an increase in
fleet capacity and larger nets. STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE AT
THE OPENING OF THE SECOND SESSION, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/I1 (1993). [hereinafter
STATEMENT AT THE SECOND SESSION]; Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 255, 261-62 (1994); Jon L. Jacobson, Symposium: Law of the Sea: International
Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1985).
2. Anne Ketover, International Environmental Law Colloquium: Fouling Our Own Nest:
Rapid Population Growth and Its Effect on the Environment, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 443(1994).
3. REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL CONSULTATION ON HIGH SEAS FISHING AND THE PAPERS
PRESENTED AT THE TECHNICAL CONSULTATION ON HIGH SEAS FISHING, at 63-64, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 164/INF/2 (1993).
4. SOME HIGH SEAS FISHERIES ASPECTS RELATING TO STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/INF/4 (1993). Total ocean fish
catches were 86 million metric tons in 1989; by 1992 this was reduced by nearly 5 million metric
tons. STATEMENT AT THE SECOND SESSION, supra note 1, at 1. Stocks were still deteriorating
in 1995. STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE OPENING OF THE
FIFTH SESSION, HELD ON 27 MARCH 1995, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/26 (1995) [hereinafter
STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE FIFTH SESSION].
5. Suzanne Iudicello & Margaret Lytle, Biodiversity Symposium: Marine Biodiversity and
International Law: Instruments and Institutions That Can Be Used to Conserve Marine
Biodiversity Internationally, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 127 (1994).
6. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 259.
7. Unemployment is reaching 20% in Newfoundland's fishing towns and 25% of New-
foundlanders are on welfare. Michael L. Lyster, Decimated Resources Fuel a Fish War, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, April 19, 1995, at B7. The Canadian government has spent more than
$730 million in relief and promises over $1 billion more for compensation due to the fishing
moratorium it declared. Id.
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cultures are disintegrating." Unfortunately, overfishing continues without
effective regulation or conservation efforts.
The international community has attempted to regulate fisheries in two
ways. Part of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in
1982 (UNCLOS III) 9 established a management regime for international
fisheries. As this Comment will show, it has not been successful. Some
states also formed regional fishery management organizations to regulate
fishing of specific areas or specific fish stocks. These regional groups have
not been successful either.
Two types of fish stocks are especially at risk from the lack of regula-
tion: straddling stocks ° and highly migratory fish stocks." These stocks
are difficult to regulate because they travel through waters within the
jurisdiction of different coastal states and in the high seas. This is trouble-
some because unrestrained fishing on the high seas undermines any measures
taken by coastal states to conserve these stocks. Currently, there is no
effective international mechanism for regulating fishing of these species on
the high sea.
In December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to hold
a conference specifically on the issue of straddling stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks.' 2 After two years of negotiations and five substantive
sessions, the United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks reached an agreement on August 4, 1995.13 This
8. Many villages in Canada are completely dependent upon fishing for their income and
culture. After Canada's fishing moratorium, their entire lifestyle was disrupted. Brad
Knickerbocker, Fishing Lessons for a Family and the World, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
April 4, 1995, at 11. Overfishing and overpopulation are also destroying rural fishing
communities in less developed countries. In Mexico, fish stocks in the Sea of Cortez have
declined to the extent that many fishermen cannot catch even enough fish to pay for their boat
fuel. Tom Knudson, Despair for the Future is Fishermen's Daily Catch, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 12, 1995, at A12. Unlike Canada, there are no government subsidies. People either catch
fish or they starve. Id. Rising population and decreasing fish stocks in the Philippines have led
to a 50% malnutrition rate among children in fishing villages. Colin Nickerson, Fish Stocks
Decimated by World Feeding Frenzy, THE TIMES-PICAYuNE, Dec. 25, 1994, at A30. The
numbers are even higher in fishing communities in Bangladesh, Ecuador and Tanzania where
local people cannot compete with the technology used by other nations off their shores. Id.
9. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
10. Straddling stocks are fish found in waters overlapping the boundary between a state's
coastal waters and the adjacent high seas. Alison Rieser, A.S.I.L. Observer Comments on UN
Conference on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks, A.S.I.L. NEWSLETTER, at 12, Nov. 1993.
11. Highly migratory fish stocks are fish with habitats that range over vast areas of the
ocean, on the high seas and sometimes in the coastal waters of many states. Id.
12. G.A. Res. 47/192, 47th Sess., 93rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/192 (1993).
13. The first session was held April 19-23, 1993. At the second session, from July 12-30,
1993, delegates held formal sessions and informal consultations on each issue and created a draft
negotiating text to serve as the basis for negotiation at the next session. The third session was
held March 14-31, 1994. Delegates continued debate and reviewed the negotiating text. Much
of the conference was held in closed, informal sessions and a new revised negotiating text was
created. The fourth session was held August 15-26, 1994. General comments and informal
sessions convened until a draft agreement was completed. Informal consultations on the difficult
issues of enforcement and compliance were carried out between the Chair and interested
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Agreement (the Fish Stock Treaty) establishes new international guidelines
for fishing on the high seas. 4
This Comment discusses how the Fish Stock Treaty changes international
fisheries management from the UNCLOS III regime. Section I discusses the
development of the law of the sea and how this law designated zones for
fishery management jurisdiction. It focuses on regional management
organizations and enforcement under UNCLOS III. Section II reviews the
provisions in the Fish Stock Treaty and examines whether they will offer a
solution to the problem of conserving straddling and migratory fish stocks.
This Comment concludes that while the agreement does solve several
problems, it falls short of establishing the provisions that would be necessary
for truly effective conservation of these problematic fish stocks.
I. BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
A. Historical Development of Fisheries Management
The existing law of the sea has developed over the last two thousand
years. Throughout this development, the seas have been split into two
distinct regions: the territorial sea and the high sea.' 5 The territorial sea is
the area along the coastline extending into the ocean a specific distance from
the shore of a coastal state. Throughout most of this century, the territorial
sea extended three nautical miles from the shore.' 6 The coastal state has
complete jurisdiction and control over this region, including all fishing
rights.'7 The high seas are the waters beyond the territorial sea and are
delegations. At the fifth session, March 27-April 12, 1995, delegates generally spent time
discussing high seas enclaves, enforcement and compliance. A new draft agreement was
circulated. The last session was held July 24-August 4, 1995, when more informal sessions
convened on the same difficult issues until delegates approved the draft agreement. See Chad
Carpenter et al., A Summary Report on the Fifth Substantive Session of the Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Conference, 7 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, No. 54 (Aug.
7, 1995). Meltzer, supra note 1, at 325-27.
14. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter FISH STOCK TREATY].
15. Designations of territorial waters and the high seas date back at least as far as ancient
Rome. The Romans believed the sea was res nullius and that it should, therefore, be open to all.
This concept was also recognized in other parts of the Mediterranean and England through the
middle ages to this century. At the same time, the right of a state to control a narrow belt of sea
along its coast was also part of customary law. E.g., JAMES C.F. WANG, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN
POLITICS AND LAW 75-76, 95-96 (1992); GEORGE P. SMITH II, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF
FREE SEAS: MODERN MARITIME LAW RE-EVALUATED 13-24 (1980). A similar concept of
freedom of the seas developed in Southeast Asia as well. See R.P. Anand, Maritime Practice in
South-East Asia Until 1600 A.D. and the Modern Law of the Sea, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 440,
442-47 (1981).
16. WANG, supra note 15, at 95-97.
17. Shigeru Oda, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77
AM. J. INT'L. L. 739, 739 (1983).
1996]
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under no state's control. Freedom of the high sea has traditionally been one
of the most fundamental principles in international law, and included the
principle of open fishing on the high seas.'" Until now, a state could not
regulate fishing on the high seas except by agreement with other states.' 9
The primary obstacle to international fishery regulation is reconciling the
interests of the coastal states with those of the distant water fishing nations
(DWFNs) in the high seas. DWFNs are landlocked states and states that have
the fleet capacity to fish distant regions.2° DWFNs must often rely on high
seas fisheries unless they have access to fishing in another state's coastal
waters. DWFNs want to keep the high seas free from regulation by coastal
states in order to protect their right to exploit straddling and migratory fish
stocks. Coastal states control the resources in their coastal waters and can
regulate the fish stocks found there.2 Because they have an interest in the
long-term viability of coastal resources, they also want to control the
straddling stocks that travel into high seas areas. 2 Coastal states and
DWFNs each strive for control of straddling and migratory fish stocks.
Coastal states and DWFNs also have competing interests in the fish
stocks themselves. DWFNs do not always have an interest in the long-term
sustainability of these fish stocks. They may only want to exploit the
resource for a short time and then move to another area if catches de-
crease.23  Coastal states, however, cannot move. Consequently, they will
always want the resources in their coastal waters to be plentiful and stable.
Furthermore, some coastal states, especially developing countries, do not have
18. For thousands of years, states believed that ocean resources were inexhaustible. This
belief did not change until new technological advances, increased demand for ocean resources,
and emerging nations began to deplete once bountiful fishing grounds. WANG, supra note 15,
at 78.
19. Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1170-71.
20. Major DWFNs include Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea and Poland. See WANG, supra note
15, at 137-139. Russia and the United States can be considered both coastal and DWFNs
because each has expansive coastal waters and the capacity to fish distant high seas. In
negotiations, each has sided with coastal states or DWFNs depending on what measures or
regions were in question. William C. McLean & Sompong Sucharitkul, Fisheries Management
and Development in the EEZ: The North, South and Southwest Pacific Experience, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 492, 496-98 (1988). China also has an expansive coastline, yet is classified as
a DWFN because its coastal waters are less abundant, and because it has invested heavily in high
seas fishing technology. Id. at 500-01.
21. The most influential coastal states include Chile, Argentina, Canada, and the South
Pacific Island States. Jon M. Van Dyke, Modifying the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New
Initiatives on Governance of High Seas Fisheries Resources: the Straddling Stocks Negotiations,
10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 219, 221 (1995).
22. Coastal states may be interested because they want to exploit the fish itself or because
they have been given the responsibility of stock management under UNCLOS Il1. BACKGROUND
PAPER PREPARED BY SECRETARIAT, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/INF/5 (1993) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND PAPER].
23. Id.
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the resources to fish distant waters.24 If coastal states cannot regulate
fishing of straddling stocks adjacent to their shores, DWFNs may deplete
those stocks through overfishing on the adjacent high seas. Any international
fishing regulation has to balance these two interests carefully.
B. Fishery Management Under UNCLOS III
In 1982, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea agreed
to changes in international law regarding jurisdiction over water and living
resources. This agreement was a codification of customary international
law.25 Under UNCLOS III, the seas were divided into three categories: the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the high sea.
UNCLOS III expanded the traditional territorial sea limit from three to
twelve nautical miles from the shore.26 The creation of the EEZ was a
newer concept that extended limited coastal control 200 nautical miles from
the shoreline." Within its EEZ, the coastal state has exclusive rights for
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living resources.28 Territori-
al waters and the EEZs encompass about 40% of the world's oceans29 and
90% of its marine resources.3"
UNCLOS III only slightly modified the traditional principle of freedom
of the high seas. It recognized the principle that all states have the right for
their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas.3 It emphasized the
fact, however, that this right was subject to the state's treaty obligations and
the rights, duties and interests of coastal states, as established in other articles
of UNCLOS III.32 Among these articles, there was an obligation to cooper-
ate and set up management measures with other states fishing for straddling
24. See NASILA S. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 169 (1980);
Frida Maria Armas Pfirter, Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks in Latin American
Practice and Legislation: New Perspectives in Light of Current International Negotiations, 26
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 127, 128 (1995).
25. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, at pmbl. Codification means that the general accepted
practice and custom of states is confirmed in written law. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (3d ed. 1993).
26. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, art. 3.
27. Id. art. 57.
28. Id. art. 56(1). Coastal control in the EEZ is over economic resources; it is not an
extended territorial sea. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES:
UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND 30-43 (1994); UNCLOS III, supra note 9, at xxv.
29. Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1179.
30. Rieser, supra note 10.
31. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, art. 116.
32. Id.
1996]
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and highly migratory fish stocks. 3 States were also obligated to act in "due
regard" to the interests of other states exercising their right to fish these
resources on the high seas.34 Unfortunately, this duty to cooperate was not
clarified further and states did not cooperate. 35  Regional organizations did
not form in the manner anticipated by UNCLOS III and when they did form,
there were no effective mechanisms for enforcement. Even after UNCLOS
III, the high seas remained free and there was no effective international
regulation for conserving straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.36
C. Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
UNCLOS III encouraged states to cooperate in managing straddling
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, but did not set international
guidelines for developing or operating these organizations. Several regional
organizations emerged or were reorganized after 1982 in an attempt to follow
UNCLOS III, but were unsuccessful. The examples that follow demonstrate
how UNCLOS III failed to conserve straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks.
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 37 was organized
in order to realize UNCLOS III principles for high seas fishing.38  Its
members sought to cooperate in utilizing, managing and conserving the
fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic.39 Unfortunately, NAFO could not fulfill
this goal.40 The treaty contained a provision which allowed any member
33. Id. arts. 63, 64, 118; THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE REGIME FOR HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES:
STATUS AND PROSPECTS, at 10-11, U.N. Sales No.E.92.V. 12 (1992) [hereinafter REGIME FOR
HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES]. The problems of straddling and migratory fish stocks were known to the
participants of UNCLOS III, but their conservation was not seen as urgent. STATEMENT MADE
BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE OPENING OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/7 (1993). Fish stocks were not at the level of depletion that they
have reached in the past few years and states were content with the fact that articles 63 and 64
left the resolution of problems up to the duty to cooperate in good faith. Id.
34. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, art. 87.
35. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 22, at 24-25.
36. See Oda, supra note 17, at 741; ludicello & Lytle, supra note 5, at 133; BURKE, supra
note 28, at 348.
37. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct.
24, 1978, transmitted for advice and consent as to U.S. accession as Sen. Exec. Doc. T, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter NAFO Convention]. The United States has yet to join
NAFO.
38. NAFO membership includes Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark (with respect to the
Faroe Islands and Greenland), Estonia, the European Union, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Korea,
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and Russia. Max Collett, Achieving Effective
International Fishery Management: A Critical Analysis of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish
Stocks, 4 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 n.18 (1995). NAFO covers the high seas between
Canada, the Northeast U.S. and Greenland. Bernard Applebaum, The Straddling Stocks Problem.
The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for Coastal State Action, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONS 282, 305 (Alfred H. A. Soons, ed. 1990).
39. Collett, supra note 38, at 7.
40. See generally Applebaum, supra note 38.
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state to make objections to management measures. 41 When a state made an
objection, it was no longer legally bound by that provision.42 Although this
made it easier to get initial cooperation, the ease with which states could
object out of management measures led to NAFO's failure. For example,
allocation levels were a contentious issue in the organization. When one
member state objected to its allocation, it was able to set its own higher
limit.43 Consequently, the members did not cooperate in conservation efforts
as required by UNCLOS III.
Another regional organization is the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency (F.F.A.). 4  The F.F.A. was originally founded by several South
Pacific Island states whose livelihood depended on the conservation of ocean
resources. 45  Establishing this organization was critical because 80% of the
migratory fish stocks in the regulated area were being taken by DWFNs. 46
Unfortunately, DWFNs did not cooperate with F.F.A. regulations and
continued to fish in the region. The United States, for example, routinely
fished illegally in regulated areas until it was sanctioned twice.47  This
problem did not end until the United States and other DWFNs finally entered
into agreement with the F.F.A. in 1987. 4' After this, the F.F.A. was one of
the more successful organizations because of cooperation by its members,
41. NAFO Convention, supra note 37, art. XII.
42. Collett, supra note 38, at 10-11.
43. At first all members followed NAFO regulations, but the European Union changed its
position in 1985. It refused to be bound by NAFO's catch allocations and Spain and Portugal
then set their own limits. Applebaum, supra note 36, at 285. This change of position preceded
the scheduled entrance of Spain and Portugal into the European Union in January 1986, which
significantly increased European Union fishing capacity. Collett, supra note 38, at 10.
44. South Pacific Forum Fisheries Convention of 1979, July 10, 1979, reprinted in Soons,
supra note 38, at 330.
45. There are sixteen member states including Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Ninue, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
McLean & Sucharitkul, supra note 20, at 523 n. 108. For background on the development of the
F.F.A., see William M. Sutherland, Management, Conservation, and Cooperation in EEZ
Fishing: The Law oJ the Sea Convention and the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 18
OCEAN DEV. & INT L L. 613 (1987).
46. Judith Swan, Highly Migratory Species: The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, in
Soons, supra note 38, at 318. Some of these states include the United States, Japan and Korea,
the Soviet Union, Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines. McLean & Sucharitkul, supra note 20,
at 524-30.
47. In 1982 a U.S vessel, the Danica, was arrested and fined nearly $200,000 for fishing
without a license in Papua New Guinea territory. In 1984 another U.S. vessel, the Jeannette
Diana, was arrested in the Solomon Islands and fined nearly $540,000 for illegal fishing in its
territory. Both times, the United States retaliated with embargoes against the charging state.
McLean & Sucharitkul, supra note 20, at 528.
48. Id. at 529. Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States
and the Government of the United States of America, April 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1048. DWFNs
that have entered into agreements with the F.A.A. include Russia, Japan, Korea and Thailand.
McLean & Sucharitkul, supra note 20, at 524-26.
19961
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stronger enforcement provisions and clearer regulations.49 The organization,
however, will benefit from stronger international guidelines.
Another attempt to manage straddling stocks is the convention for the
Bering Sea "Donut Hole."5 This area has been particularly troublesome
because although the United States and Russia control most of the area where
the straddling stocks are found, other nations extensively fish the small area
adjacent to U.S. and Russian EEZs. I States refused to cooperate or agree
on measures for conserving fish stocks until there was a dramatic decrease in
fish catches.52 In 1994, all of the states involved finally agreed to suspend
fishing until an agreement for conservation could be reached. 3 The Donut
Hole treaty'4 was opened for signature in 1994. s The first annual confer-
ence was held in November 1995, but the treaty has not been in effect long
enough to analyze its effectiveness. 6
Other regulatory bodies primarily aimed at conserving a specific
migratory species have also emerged. Migratory species are nearly impossi-
ble to regulate on a purely local level because they are often found primarily
in the high seas. The main methods of regulation have been setting catch
quotas and limiting the types of equipment that fishing vessels could use,
such as prohibitions on certain types of nets." These organizations have
achieved varying levels of cooperation. The International Pacific Halibut
Commission (IPHC) 5s has been one of the more successful because it
consists of only two states, the United States and Canada. 9 This makes
49. The F.F.A. is one of the most comprehensive fisheries access agreements in the world.
Swan, supra note 46, at 340. The F.F.A. maintains a registry of fishing vessels in which a vessel
must maintain standing to fish in the regulated area It also mandates that records of catch and
effort data be maintained in a standardized logbook, that coastal state laws be followed and that
flag states agree to specific enforcement responsibilities. Id. at 318-29.
50. The "Donut Hole" refers to a small area of high seas in the Bering Sea encircled by the
EEZs of Russia and the United States. Unrestrained fishing by both coastal states and flag states
have severely depleted the straddling stocks found there. CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE STRADDLING FISH STOCKS IN THE BERING SEA AND THE SEA OF OKHOTSK, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/L.33 (1993) [hereinafter BERING SEA].
51. Id. at 2; Stuart B. Kaye, Legal Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative
Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the
Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75, 100 (1995).
52. Total fish catches were 1.4 million metric tons in 1989. BERING SEA, supra note 50, at
1. By 1992 the yearly catch totaled only about 10,000 metric tons. Id.
53. Kaye, supra note 51, at 102.
54. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollack Resources in the Central
Bering Sea, June 16, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 67 (1995), reprinted in 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 127-34 (1995).
55. Kaye, supra note 51, at 102.
56. Cooperation is currently high between member states, but future success is still
problematic. Many of these same states have tried to cooperate to conserve fish stocks in the Sea
of Okhotsk "Peanut Hole" as well, but have not been successful. Id. at 106.
57. Iudicello & Lytle, supra note 5, at 134.
58. Preservation of the Halibut Fishing of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea
Convention, March 2, 1953, U.S.-Canada 5 U.S.T. 5.
59. ludicello & Lytle, supra note 5, at 134 n.77.
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cooperation and consensus easier but negotiations are not always successful.
The United States and Canada have failed to agree on several measures
recommended by the IPHC.6' The International Commission for Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)61 is one of the most important organizations
because it covers nearly all of the Atlantic Ocean and has many member
states, both coastal and DWFNs. It has been in existence for over twenty-five
years and has been amended several times.62 ICCAT has not fared as well
as the IPHC because it suffers from the common problems of lack of
consensus on management measures and allocation levels.63 On the whole,
organizations like these have simply been insufficient to regulate migratory
stocks on an international level.
In summary, regional organizations have suffered from the lack of
international guidelines for regulating high sea fisheries under UNCLOS III.
Although there was a general duty to cooperate under UNCLOS III, states did
not comply. Member states did not always cooperate with agreed measures
and non-member states often ignored organization regulations. As a result,
the organizations were unsuccessful at conserving straddling or highly
migratory fish stocks.'
D. Enforcement Provisions Under UNCLOS III
One of the predominant reasons for the failure of regional organizations
is that UNCLOS III did not establish international guidelines or mechanisms
for enforcement. Because of this deficiency, the organizations formed under
UNCLOS III did not establish effective mechanisms to enforce regulations on
the high seas either.65 Member states proved unable to enforce organization
regulations against non-member states. They also lacked the ability to
60. Bob Mottram, Battling Over By-Catch: Negotiations Fail in Halibut Treaty with Canada,
NEWS TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 1995, at C4.
61. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, March 3, 1969, 20
U.S.T. 2887. Parties to the treaty are: the United States, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, Canada,
France, Spain, Brazil, Portugal, Morocco, Korea, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cuba, Angola and the
Soviet Union. David C. Hoover, A Case Against International Management of Highly Migratory
Marine Fishery Resources: The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, II B. C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 11, 16.
For views on ICCAT, see Id. and Christopher M. Weld, Critical Evaluation of Existing
Mechanisms for Managing Highly Migratory Pelagic Species in the Atlantic Ocean, 20 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 285 (1989).
62. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 317.
63. Iudicello & Lytle, supra note 5, at 134 n.78.
64. Id. at 133; Oda, supra note 17, at 754. Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures
on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 Arising from New Fisheries
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 343 (1989).
STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE OPENING OF THE FOURTH
SESSION. HELD ON 15 AUGUST 1994, AT 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/21 (1994).
65. ICCAT, for example, did not provide any enforcement mechanisms. Meltzer, supra note
1, at 320; see also BURKE, supra note 28, at 303. Successful enforcement requires a high level
of detection capability, procedures for inspection of proper gear and licenses, and the ability to
arrest and apply sanctions. Id. at 307-11.
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enforce cooperation among members, relied too much on flag state account-
ability and failed to provide guidelines for penalties and sanctions.
One of the difficulties that arose was the inability to require that non-
member states follow organization regulations. Because only parties are
bound by a treaty, states who were not parties could fish in regulated areas
without being subject to the regulations.66 UNCLOS III requires states to
cooperate with these organizations67 but does not provide a way to enforce
this requirement. DWFNs often refused to join or defied the regulations
outright.68 This was one reason for NAFO's failure. The United States was
not a member, but it fished in NAFO territory, exploiting straddling stocks
without regard to any conservation efforts. 69  NAFO could do nothing to
stop U.S. exploitation because it had no power to enforce provisions against
non-members on high sea territory. Freedom of fishing on the high seas was
still the law. This lack of enforcement power undermined NAFO's ability to
conserve the regulated fish stocks.
Furthermore, there was no way to ensure that member states would
cooperate for conservation purposes. UNCLOS III merely provided that
states should form regional organizations, it did not set out methods which
could be used by member states to enforce regulations. It was left up to each
organization to develop enforcement provisions of its own. Those that were
adopted, such as the monitoring of vessels and inspection of ships at sea,7"
could be rendered ineffectual if states refused to cooperate.
Enforcing conservation measures was also difficult under UNCLOS III
because it did nothing to change accountability for enforcement. On the high
seas, vessels were only accountable to the flag state7 and laws imposed on
them by the flag state.72 If a regional management organization developed
such rules for its members, each member could participate in inspection or
surveillance of all others.73 But once a violation was found, flag states
alone had the ability to prosecute the offender.74 Member states were
usually unwilling to give other states the authority to take action against
66. Miles & Burke, supra note 63, at 355.
67. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, art. 118.
68. REGIME FOR HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES, supra note 33, at 26-27.
69. Collett, supra note 38, at 11.
70. See BuRKE, supra note 28, at 338-45. One reason that this approach has not been
successful is that states are deterred by the high cost of this type of surveillance. This is a special
concern for developing nations with few resources to spend on monitoring EEZ and high sea
activity. Registers of vessels with good standing requirements and aerial surveillance are often
easier and cheaper, but have not been put into effect by regional organizations. See Gerald
Moore, Enforcement Without Force: New Techniques in Compliance Control for Foreign Fishing
Operations Based on Regional Cooperation, 24 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 197, 197-200 (1993).
71. The term "flag state" refers to the state that grants a vessel the right to sail under its
flag. WANG, supra note 15, at 398.
72. Oda, supra note 17, at 749. Moore, supra note 70, at 201.
73. Few agreements have been specific enough in flag state responsibilities to make this an
effective way to enforce regulations. REGIME FOR HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES, supra note 33, at 27.
74. Id. at 35.
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violators.75 Consequently, sanctions and prosecutions were not always
carried through.
UNCLOS III also lacked international guidelines for the imposition of
sanctions when regulations were violated. Under UNCLOS III, coastal states
had jurisdiction to arrest vessels which violated laws within the coastal state's
territorial waters or EEZ.76 Financial penalties were the only available
punishment for violation." Regional organizations could also develop arrest
provisions for vessels on the high seas."8 UNCLOS III did not specify what
penalties were available for high seas violations, but it would seem to follow
that financial penalties would be the usual sanction for these violations as
well. Because there were no standards under UNCLOS III for applying
financial penalties, each arresting state was left to decide the penalty itself,
thus leading to inconsistent fines.79 All of these problems demonstrate how
stronger enforcement provisions will be needed if conservation is to be
successful.
E. Unilateral Actions Resulting From the Lack of
International Guidelines
Due to the growing necessity of conserving straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks and the ineffectiveness of UNCLOS III, several states
acted unilaterally to regulate fishing on the high seas. For example, Canada
recently adopted legislation to prohibit all fishing of straddling stocks off its
coasts and in the adjacent high seas NAFO territory."0 This legislation also
attempted to protect straddling stocks beyond the Canadian EEZ by allowing
Canada to seize foreign vessels that violated NAFO regulations."' In March
1995, Canada seized a Spanish ship believed to be fishing illegally in this
area, resulting in continuing legal and diplomatic controversy with Spain.82
75. Id. at 27; BURKE, supra note 28, at 303.
76. UNCLOS III, supra note 9, art. 73(1).
77. Oda, supra note 17, at 747.
78. REGIME FOR HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES, supra note 33, at 35.
79. One suggestion made and followed in the F.F.A.-U.S. agreement is to require that
penalties set on flag state vessels be the same amount that would be applied to foreign vessels
operating in the flag state's EEZ illegally. Moore, supra note 70, at 202. If adopted, this
practice would lead to more consistency.
80. An Act to Amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, May 12, 1994, ch. 14, 1994 S.C.
(Can.).
81. Miles & Burke, supra note 63, at 344-45; Collett, supra note 38, at 2-3.
82. In March 1995, Canadian gunboats seized a Spanish ship, the Estai and cut the nets from
another vessel. Spain responded by sending in its ships to protect Spanish fishermen. It was
feared that shots would be fired. Ved P. Nanda, Crisis Heats Up over Global Fish Stocks, THE
DENVER POST, Apr. 16, 1995, at D4. Spain also retaliated by requiring Canadian tourists to
obtain visas before visiting and filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice. Spain
Brings a Case Against Canada, I.C.J., Communique No. 95/8, March 29, 1995; John Darnton,
Two Feuding Nations with Fish Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 4 at 4. As of March 1996,
this claim was still pending before the International Court of Justice. Justice for All from a
Global Courtroom, THE LAWYER, Mar. 19, 1996, at 9.
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Out of the same concern that international law could not protect
endangered resources, Chile introduced the idea of a "Presential Sea" in
1991.13 This concept extended conservation measures similar to those taken
within Chile's EEZ to the adjacent high seas. 4 It provided for increased
surveillance, monitoring, and Chilean fishing.8" The Presential Sea concept
was not meant as a jurisdictional claim to the area.8 6 Rather, it was thought
that by undertaking more economic and monitoring activities in the high seas,
Chile's national economy would be enhanced by ensuring that conservation
efforts in its EEZ were not undermined."
The international community should not have to rely on the unilateral
actions of individual states to protect fish stocks. This approach leads to
inconsistency among different regions and does not encourage cooperation.
It may also lead to more international disputes, such as the one between Spain
and Canada. These unilateral actions, the failure of regional organizations
and continuing overfishing all demonstrated the need for a new international
management regime to conserve straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
II. THE U.N. CONFERENCE AND FISH STOCK TREATY
A. Background of the Conference
In 1992, participants at the Earth Summit in Rio agreed to an internation-
al conference under the auspices of the United Nations to deal with the
specific problem of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.88 The goals
of the conference were to identify and assess existing problems related to the
conservation and management of these stocks, consider means of improving
83. This idea was introduced by a high-ranking Chilean naval officer. Jorge Martinez
Busch, El Mar Presencial, Actualidad, Desafios y Futuro [The Presential Sea: The Present
Situation, Challenges and the Future] (transcript of a master class given by Navy Commander
Jorge Martinez Busch at the Vina del Mar Municipal Auditorium on May 2, 1991, reprinted in
Revista de la Marina) cited in Christopher Joyner & Peter N. de Cola, Chile's Presential Sea
Proposal: Implications for Straddling Stocks & the International Law of Fisheries, 24 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 120 n.53 (1993). It later became part of Chilean fisheries law. Law No.
19.079 (Chile), Official Journal, September 6, 1991.
84. Pfirter, supra note 24, at 136.
85. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Toward an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and
the Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea, 24 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 81, 87-89(1993). For a general discussion of the Presential Sea proposal see Joyner & De Cola, supra note
83, at 99. Other Latin American States have been supportive of such claims. See Pfirter, supra
note 24, at 135-37.
86. Pfirter, supra note 24, at 136.
87. Vicuna, supra note 85, at 88.
88. At the Earth Summit, the committee on global overfishing negotiated at length without
success. The committee finally decided that the United Nations needed to hold an intergovern-
mental conference on this issue alone. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, RIO DE JANEIRO, 3-14 JuNE 1992, at 145-46, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II). The resolution to hold the conference was adopted January 29, 1993;
G.A. Res. 47/192, supra note 12.
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cooperation among states and formulate appropriate recommendations. 89
Recommendations were to be made under the framework of UNCLOS III by
clarifying and strengthening the relevant rights and duties of states pertaining
to high seas fishing.9° The chairperson of the Conference on Straddling
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Satya Nandan of Fiji, agreed that
effective conservation required "global solutions" because it concerned "the
international community as a whole," not just individual states. 9'
A critical debate at the opening of the conference was whether the final
product should be a binding agreement or merely a declaration or recommen-
dation. Most DWFNs did not want to create a binding treaty.92 Canada,
Chile and other coastal states insisted that any decision needed to be binding
in order to be effective. 93 In the end, the conference became a binding
treaty.
94
Every article in the treaty was eventually approved by consensus. 95
Two areas, however, were particularly controversial: compliance standards for
regional fishery management organizations, and enforcement mechanisms.
96
Because these issues were behind many of the failures of UNCLOS III, this
was to be expected.
The debate over these issues centered around the interests of the coastal
states versus the interests of the DWFNs. On one hand, the coastal states
wanted to increase their power to regulate in order to better manage
straddling stocks outside their EEZs.97 On the other hand, DWFNs resisted
89. A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE PREPARED BY THE CHAIRMAN, at
1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/10 (1993).
90. See generally BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 22.
91. STATEMENT MADE AT THE OPENING OF THE FIFTH SESSION, supra note 4, at 3.
92. LETTER DATED 26 MAY 1993 FROM THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FISHERIES AFFAIRS,
BUREAU OF OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.164/L.3 (1993). The U.S. took the position that it would be appropriate to have
a resolution or declaration rather than attempt to create a binding agreement. Id Japan was also
against creating a binding treaty. A/CONF.164/L.6 at 2. Others opposed to a binding treaty
include China, Korea and the European Union. Ted L. McDorman, Stateless Fishing Vessels:
International Law and the UN. High Seas Fisheries Conference, 25 J. MAR. L & COM. 531, 547
(1994).
93. LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1993 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION OF CANADA
TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/L.5 (1993). Others who supported a binding treaty included Argentina and the
South Pacific Island States. McDorman, supra note 92, at 547-48.
94. Although done under the framework of UNCLOS III, this treaty is not a codification
of customary international law. Member states are nonetheless urged to encourage other states
to sign and to deter any activities by non-member state vessels that undermine conservation
efforts. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, art. 33(2).
95. REPORT ON THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING
FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/36 (1995).
This consensus makes it more likely that the treaty will be ratified quickly.
96. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 326-27.
97. Van Dyke, supra note 21, at 221.
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any further control by coastal states. 98
During negotiations, the participants examined the rights and duties of
states under UNCLOS 111. 99 They agreed that the rights of states included
the right to exploit a particular resource °° and that their duties consisted of
cooperating in conservation efforts by adhering to regional regulations and
enforcing the regulations on their vessels.' The Fish Stock Agreement
strengthens each of these rights and duties.
B. Regional Management Organizations Under
the Fish Stock Treaty
Although the conference's regulations are international in scope, most of
its provisions will be implemented by regional management organizations.
Such organizations may be newly established in furtherance of the Fish Stock
Treaty or pre-existing organizations that are re-arranged or strengthened by
it.'0 2 The Fish Stock Treaty sets out general and specific standards for the
development of regional organizations. In recognition of the problems of
cooperation faced by existing organizations, the Fish Stock Treaty strengthens
the duty to cooperate and makes it clearer than it was under UNCLOS III.
Under the Fish Stock Treaty, all states with a "real interest" in the
fisheries concerned must become members of these organizations or agree to
comply with organization regulations.'0 3 Most importantly, if states refuse
either to comply or become members, they will have no access to that
fishery's resources.' °4 This provision drastically alters the traditional idea
of freedom of the high seas. For the first time, international law will limit
access to high sea fisheries. If states do not cooperate, they will be barred
from fishing the region in question.
As an improvement upon UNCLOS III, the guidelines for developing
98. See ORGANIZATION OF WORK: LIST OF ISSUES SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF
JAPAN, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/L.6 (1993) which states that the Convention did not stipulate
special interests or preferential rights in coastal states with respect to conservation of living
resources and that coastal states should not take unilateral action to conserve resources outside
their EEZs. Id. at 1. In a subsequent letter, the delegation of Japan again stressed that the rights
of coastal states must not impinge upon the freedom of fishing on the high sea. COMMENTS ON
COMPATIBILITY AND COHERENCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION
MEASURES FOR THE SAME STOCK (SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN), at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/L.28 (1993) [hereinafter COMMENTS ON COMPATIBILITY].
99. See generally A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, supra note 89.
100. Id. at 1-4. This was recognized as a general right, but not a guarantee of the ability
to fish in all areas of the sea at any time. Id. at 12-13.
101. REGIME FOR HIGH-SEAS FISHERIES, supra note 33, at 10-11.
102. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, arts. 8, 13.
103. Id. art. 8(3). A state with a real interest is one which is fishing for the particular
straddling or migratory fish stock regulated by the organization, or fishing generally in the region
in question. Article 8 ensures that regional organizations will be open to all states without
discrimination. Id.
104. Id. art. 8(4).
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regional organizations are set out in the Fish Stock Treaty. °5 During the
formation of an organization, states must identify which fish stocks to
regulate and how the new organization will work with any existing organiza-
tions.0 6 In setting up provisions, they must consider the biological charac-
teristics of the stocks concerned and the socio-economic, geographical and
environmental characteristics of the region involved. 7 The fact that the
guidelines are to be agreed upon during the formation period' should
encourage states to join together quickly or risk being left out of the
negotiating process.
In order to further ensure cooperation, the treaty specifies how states are
to fulfill this obligation. In general, they must promote and conduct scientific
assessments of the regulated stocks, cooperate in monitoring and surveillance
of regulated areas, agree on catch allocations and promote peaceful dispute
settlements.' 9 Particular requirements are established as well. For exam-
ple, if an international body establishes conservation minimums, these
minimums must also be adopted by the regional organizations."0
Because of the stronger duty to cooperate and the right of organizations
to exclude non-members, DWFNs voiced concern about being denied entry
into organizations."' This remained a controversial point because coastal
states wanted to ensure that only states with a real interest in the fishery
would become members." 2 The Fish Stock Treaty attempts to address this
issue by setting out the rights of new members to ensure that DWFN interests
are balanced with those of the coastal state. It mandates that needs of coastal
states, the existing level of fishing, and new member contributions to
conservation must be considered when deciding upon new entrants. 3 Non-
governmental organizations also reserved the right to participate in organiza-
tional meetings as observers and receive records from meetings." 4
105. Id. arts. 9-10.
106. Id. arts. 9(l)(a) & (c).
107. Id. art. 8 (1)(b).
108. Id. art. 9.
109. Id. art. 10.
110. Id. art. 10(c).
111. Japan took the position that organizations should be open to all parties with equal
participation. COMMENTS ON COMPATIBILITY, supra note 99, at 1.
112. This was a serious consideration because if the states already fishing in the area agreed
to conservation efforts, new entrants would be "free riders" who could "reap the benefit of the
conservation arrangement without assuming the obligation." BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 22,
at 25.
113. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, art. 11.
114. Id. art. 12. There were over sixty NGOs represented at the conference, ranging from
environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Worldwide Fund for Nature, to Fishworker's
Unions. FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/38 (1995). NGO participation
was limited by the delegates at the Conference. In the first proposed rules of procedure NGO
representatives were allowed to make oral statements upon invitation of the presiding officer of
the body concerned. ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE: PROVISIONAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/2 (1993). The final rules adopted further limited
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Coastal states were especially concerned with their ability to control
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas and enclaves." 5 These areas are of special
concern to coastal states because they usually have jurisdiction over the entire
sea except a small central section of high seas."16 The duty to cooperate
recognizes the rights of DWFNs to access the resources in these small high
seas areas." 7 Coastal states did not want their interests undermined by
allowing more fishing by DWFNs." 8 The treaty attempted to resolve this
problem by requiring that natural characteristics (such as being an enclosed
sea) and coastal state interests be part of the consideration when developing
organization regulations and membership." 9 This requirement is expressed
in relatively weak language and is identical to that of the general require-
ments to cooperate and organize. Thus it may not have the result coastal
states wanted.
120
The Fish Stock Treaty will increase the effectiveness of regional
organizations. They will be made stronger by the ability to exclude non-
members thereby limiting the problem of exploitation by non-party states.' 2'
Even though regional management organizations will become more effective,
their ultimate success will depend on stronger enforcement provisions for both
coastal and flag states.
C. Enforcement Provisions Under the Fish Stock Treaty
The Fish Stock Treaty addresses many of the problems of compliance
and enforcement under UNCLOS III. These were topics of intense debate
participation by requiring NGOs to form themselves into constituencies with one spokesperson
for each. RULES OF PROCEDURE, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/6 (1993).
115. For example, Russia endorsed stronger coastal state rights regarding enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, submitting several letters and proposals. See, e.g., LETTER DATED 26 JULY 1993
FROM THE ALTERNATE CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/L.25 (1993)
[hereinafter LETTER FROM RUSSIAN DELEGATION]. Russia suggested that coastal states with
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas should be able to independently determine fish quotas. Id
116. Russian EEZs make up 97% of the Sea of Okhotsk and Russia wanted to ensure that
fishing on the remaining 3% high sea area, the "Peanut Hole," would not deplete such an
important fishery. BERING SEA, supra note 50, at 1-2.
117. By virtue of the fact that they are fishing in that region, DWFNs have a real interest,
and according to Article 8 of the treaty, are to be included in negotiations.
118. LETTER FROM RUSSIAN DELEGATION, supra note 115, at 4.
119. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, arts. 15-16.
120. For example, the situation in the Bering Sea is unlikely to change substantially because
it is surrounded by more than one state's EEZ and is thus controlled by Article 15. However,
Article 16 is directed at high seas areas which are surrounded by only one\state's EEZ, such as
the Sea of Okhotsk "Peanut Hole." This is a stronger provision because states must act without
delay to agree to management measures in these seas. If agreement canot be reached, the
provisions specifically stated in the Fish Stock Treaty must be applied. Evetp before agreement
is reached, DWFNs must ensure that vessels flying their flag do not engage in, fishing that could
undermine the stocks concerned. Id. art. 16. ,
121. This is the key to the new treaty's strength and had been supported earlier by those
states wanting more control over high seas resources. Miles & Burke, supra note 63, at 355.
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between coastal states and DWFNs. 22  Coastal states wanted stronger
enforcement powers under the regional organizations, while DWFNs wanted
to keep accountability with the flag state alone.'23 The final draft attempts
to balance these interests while making enforcement efforts within regional
organizations more effective.
The problem of non-member states fishing in organization territory was
a substantial concern under UNCLOS III. The ability to exclude the vessels
of non-member states from fishing the regulated high seas will give states the
enforcement power they need to successfully deter unregulated fishing.
Member states will be able to investigate and possibly even seize those
vessels fishing illegally.'24 Likewise, flag states have a stronger obligation
to ensure that vessels flying their flags comply with organization regula-
tions. '25
The Fish Stock Treaty also provides stronger enforcement measures
against the member states of each organization. States must cooperate
through regional organizations to ensure compliance with and enforcement of,
the organization's management measures.'26 Member states or flag states
may undertake investigations directly or in cooperation with other interested
states.'27 If a member state alleges a violation, the flag state has a duty to
investigate.'28 All states have the duty to cooperate with concerned state
authorities to make sure all alleged violations are investigated and sanctioned
if violations are found.1
29
Furthermore, any member state may board and inspect fishing vessels
flying the flag of other member states. 3° Inspectors can look at the vessel,
its license, gear, equipment, records, facilities, fish and fish products, and any
relevant documents needed to verify compliance. 3' Provisions for boarding
and inspecting are clearly stated in the treaty, but organizations may choose
to establish stronger provisions.3 2 Unfortunately, they may also choose to
122. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 326.
123. See COMMENTS ON COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION
OF AUSTRALIA), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/L.19 (1993) (stating that obligations of flag states
be supplemented and strengthened by regional monitoring, control and surveillance schemes).
Russia suggested that coastal states should have a strong role in surveillance and inspections.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH
CONSERVATION MEASURES FOR STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH
STOCKS, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/L.26 (1993).
124. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, art. 21.
125. Id. art. 19.
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 20(3).
128. Id. art. 19(l)(b).
129. Id. art. 20.
130. Id. art. 21(l).
131. Id. art. 22(2).
132. Id. art. 21(2).
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limit these provisions.' The treaty also provides a specific penalty for
refusal to let other member states board and inspect a vessel. If violations are
found during these inspections, the flag state must be immediately noti-
fied.' a4 The flag state must order the vessel to submit to investigation and
suspend its authorization to fish if it does not comply.'"
The resulting agreement still leaves flag states with the primary
responsibility for making sure their vessels follow regulations.'36 However,
flag state duties are clarified and strengthened. The treaty requires that flag
states enforce conservation measures regardless of where violations occur.'37
They now have a duty to immediately investigate any alleged violation and
quickly report their findings to the relevant regional organization. 38
Additionally, flag states must ensure that their vessels provide information
about their activities to any investigating authority.'39 If a violation is
found, the flag state must prevent that vessel from fishing the high sea until
the sanction process is completed. 4  Flag states retained the right to
impose penalties on their vessels according to their own laws, irrespective of
prior proceedings by another state.' 4'
Flag states must also undertake specific enforcement actions to ensure
compliance. For example, flag states must control fishing vessels through
licenses or permits and condition them on compliance with regional
organization regulations.44 Flag states must also maintain a national
registry of fishing vessels and have provisions that give other states access to
them on request. 43  They are also required to have their vessels report
their fishing effort and catch totals. 144
The Fish Stock Treaty does provide some further enforcement rights for
coastal and member states. It states that when a vessel engages in prohibited
activities, other member states may take action to keep it from fishing that
133. Id. art. 21(15). States may limit boarding and inspection procedures, but they must
develop others in their place that will still fulfill their obligation under the treaty. Id.
134. Id. art. 21(5).
135. Id. art. 22(4).
136. Id. art. 18.
137. Id. art. 19(l)(a).
138. Id. art. 19(l)(b).
139. Id. art. 19(l)(c).
140. Id. art. 19(l)(e).
141. Id. art. 21(13). This arrangement may be an effective balance between the need for
strong surveillance and detection procedures to enforce obligations and the need to respect the
rights of fishing vessels for whom lost time means lost profits. BURKE, supra note 28, at 307-08.
142. FiSH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, arts. 18(3)(a) & (b).
143. Id. art. 18(3)(c).
144. Id. art. 18(3)(e).
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region until the flag state investigates.145 This action must be in accordance
with international law or regional procedures established for this purpose.'46
Port states are also given a role in supporting conservation efforts. They may
board and inspect documents, fishing gear and catch when vessels are
voluntarily in their ports or offshore terminals. 47 If a port state finds a
violation, it may prohibit landings in its ports or prohibit transfer of the catch
for shipping."' So, although flag states still have primary authority, other
states can take some limited action against vessels who fish illegally.
The Fish Stock Treaty also addresses sanctions and penalty procedures.
The problem with the lack of international standards in applying penalties is
changed by the requirement that sanctions be "adequate in severity to be
effective in securing compliance" and "deprive offenders of the benefits
accruing from their illegal activities." '149 There may still be some inconsis-
tency, but this at least provides guidelines for states to follow.
Overall, the Fish Stock Treaty provides for better enforcement among the
regional management organizations. It gives member states more authority
to monitor and conduct investigations. But because flag states still have
primary authority over the investigation and sanctioning process, there will
always be a risk that investigations will not be thorough or that penalties will
not be strong enough. It is hoped that the clearer delineation of enforcement
duties of flag states and the chance of losing access to fisheries will minimize
this risk and make the conservation efforts of regional groups much more
effective.
D. Implementation of the Fish Stock Treaty
The Fish Stock Treaty is clearly a step in the right direction for
conserving straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. With any luck, the
United States and other nations will ratify it quickly. The document was
opened for signature on December 4, 1995.150 It will go into effect thirty
145. Id. art. 20(7). The chairman recognized that "If we are to achieve better management
of fisheries, our Agreement must go beyond the concept that the flag state is the only authority
for the taking of enforcement measures in all circumstances." STATEMENT MADE BY THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE CLOSING OF THE FIFTH SESSION, ON 12 APRIL 1995,
at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/28 (1995).
146. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, art. 20(7).
147. Id. art. 23(2).
148. Id. art. 23(3).
149. Id. art. 19(2). Measures apply to whomever is in charge of the vessel, but individual
officers of the ship may have their credentials to serve in that capacity suspended or withdrawn.
Id. This is not the only remedy available. The flag state itself will be liable in accordance with
international law to any other state damaged by its actions in violation of this treaty. Id. art. 35.
150. Id. art. 37.
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days after being ratified by thirty states,' 5 ' which is likely to occur in late
1996 or 1997. '52
The Fish Stock Treaty provides for a review conference four years after
it enters into effect.'5 3 Four years may be too soon to determine its effec-
tiveness, but it will allow for the redress of problems that become quickly
apparent, such as lack of cooperation. During this four-year period, states
will monitor the conservation efforts of regional organizations, cooperation
by states and the effectiveness of enforcement provisions. The success of the
agreement depends on state cooperation. If measures are not consistent or
effective among the various regional management organizations, the
provisions of the treaty will be further strengthened at the review confer-
ence.'
54
CONCLUSION
As international law and relations now exist, regional management
organizations may be more effective than one global body in preventing
overfishing. Regional organizations can use local solutions to conserve
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks within their regions. Under the
U.N. Fish Stock Treaty, management organizations and enforcement
provisions will become more effective than they had been under UNCLOS
III.
The Fish Stock Treaty will not, however, fully solve the problem of
worldwide overfishing and ecosystem destruction. This will require a global
regulatory regime with the power to set regulations, monitor the various
regions and enforce violations on an international level. Flag states, port
states and coastal states all need to be involved in enforcement throughout the
prosecution and sanction process. The oceans are a resource for the entire
world and regional ecosystems are all interrelated. Therefore, every state has
an interest in demanding conservation in all regions as well as in the one it
most frequently exploits. At the very least, regional organizations should
151. Id. art. 40(l). Twenty-six states signed the treaty including Argentina, Australia,
Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Fiji, Guinea Bisseau, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel,
Jamaica, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, New Zealand, Ninue, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Russia, Samoa, Senegal, Tonga, Ukraine, the United States and the ten British-ruled
territories. The treaty was not signed by DWFNs such as Poland, China, Taiwan, Korea or Japan,
or by any European Union member. Fisheries: 26 Nations Sign UN. Straddling-Stock Treaty
GREENWIRE, Dec. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, GRNWRE File; U.N. Opens
Treaty to Regulate Fishing on High Seas, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 4, 1995, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, AFP File.
152. Id. art. 40. It is likely that ratification will occur quickly because other unilateral
actions like those of Canada's and Chile's are possible. This conference shows that states have
finally realized that international cooperation is necessary to increase long-term fish catches.
Collett, supra note 38, at 32-33. Chairman Satya Nanda expects the treaty to be ratified within
two years. Greenwire, supra note 150.
153. FISH STOCK TREATY, supra note 14, art. 36(1).
154. Id. art. 36(2).
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have to adhere to high standards of conservation and enforcement. These
standards must be agreed upon at an international level.
The problem of depleting fish stocks is likely to continue. The focus of
the Fish Stock Treaty is only to maximize long-term fish catches by
coordinating fishing efforts. It does not address the mounting problems of
pollution, global warming or decreasing biodiversity in the ocean ecosystems.
Nevertheless, it provides a better regulatory scheme than the one developed
under UNCLOS III. It is also more reliable than dependence on the unilateral
actions of various states to conserve fish stocks. This author hopes that it
will be ratified and go into effect before it is too late to conserve these fish
stocks at all.
Julie R. Mack
* B.A., 1993, California State University, San Bernardino; J.D. Candidate 1997, California
Western School of Law. I would like to thank Alicia Amberg, Cheri Attix, and Matthew Ritter
for their editing assistance. Special thanks to my family for all their extra support.
1996]
21
Mack: International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on St
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1996
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss2/5
